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I. INTRODUCTION
The textbook [Ref. 1 ] by Professor Robert E. Ball, Naval
Postgraduate School, will, when published, be the first
textbook in the aircraft combat survivability discipline.
As such, it will be used by persons in many and diverse
fields as their principal source document for concepts,
terminology, computational techniques, and modeling method-
ology in survivability. Table I presents the table of
contents of the book. It will be used by aeronautical engi-
neers to improve the survivability of aircraft in the
various design stages. Tacticians will use its concepts to
evaluate strategies to reduce the susceptibility of oper-
ating aircraft. Computer specialists and mathematicians
will use it to gain a better insight into the processes and
scenarios they are attempting to moiel.
Four additions to the textbook are presented in this
thesis. Homework problems and detailed solutions for each
chapter in the textbook are given i.i Appendix A. A Lexicon
of terms is presented in Appendix B, an Index of terms is
given in Appendix C, and the important formulae and their
variables are presented in Appendix D for one easy reference
point.
The homework problems were developed based upon a number
of criteria. Certain homework problems were developed
specifically to support the stated objectives of the book.
These range from simple definitions to the development of
complex logical statements. In several cases, multiple
questions are used tc explore different aspects of a single
objective. Mathematical problems irfere developed for chap-
ters IV, V, VI, and VII, both to exercise the specific

TABLE I
TextbooJc Table of Contents
I. INTROD0CTI3N
A. AN OVERVIEW OF AlfiCRAFT COMBAT SOR VIVABILITY FUNDAMENTALS
B HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Cl U. S. MILirARY POLICIES. PROCEEDJRES, AND ORGANIZATIONS
D. SURVIVABILITY REQUIRSMSNTS FOR U. S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT
E. SURVIVABILITY PROGRAMS











F. SPECIFIC THREAT SYSTEMS
G- THE MISSION THREAT ANALYSIS
IV. COMBAT DATA ANALYSIS
A. TYPES OF DATA
bI COMBAT DATA INFORMATION CENTER (CDIC)
C. DESCRIPTION OF SOME TYPICAL COMBAT INCIDENTS
D. IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL COMPONENTS AND SYSTEMS
V. VULNERABILITY
A. WHAT IS VULNERABILITY''
bI IDENTIFICATION OF THE'cRITICAL CDMPONENTS AND THEIR




A. WHAT IS SUSCEPTIBILITY?





A. THE SURVIVABILITY PROGRAM
B. SURVIVABILITY ASSESSMENT
C. SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS
dI SURVIVABILITY DESIGN AND THE TRADE-OFF STUDY
mathematical techniques presented and to give the student
representative examples of aircraft survivability assessment
nndef realistic conditions. Multiple techniques, when
available, are used to solve the same problem. This is done
both to demonstrate the equivalence of the techniques and to
allow the student the opportunity to determine which

technique best suits his/her needs. The important concepts
of the discipline are investigated in some questions, both
by asking specifically for enumeration of various techniques
and by giving the student the opportunity to demonstrate
these concepts to himself through calculation. In all
instances, an attempt was made to provide questions which
ranged from simple to quite challenging in order to provide
suitable questions for students from all backgrounds.
A Lexicon of terms was developed to provide definitions
of those terms which might not be familiar to the student.
It is recognized that, although the text is primarily
concerned with aviation, not all those who use it will be
aviators or aeronautical engineers. Through the use of a
Lexicon it is possible to streamline the text of the book by
dispensing with lengthy definitiDns without sacrificing
comprehension of the material.
k Formulary was developed to assemble in one readily
accessable location tho^e important formulae and equations
most ccmmonly used in the discipline. The variables used in
these equations are assembled in alphabetical order in order
to facilitate the use of the formulary. No sample problems
are included because these were provided by the author in
the body of the text.
An Index was developed to allow rapid access to specific
information not identified by the table of contents. Since
the book has not yet been typeset and page numbers are not
available, the important location Df each item in the index
has been specified by chapter and paragraph number. The six
level paragraph organization of this text made this approach
quite acceptable.
The text in its final stages was proof read by this
student several times to assist in providing the best

possible product to the potential aser, and a system of
index cards was developed to prevent errors from creeping
into the various formulae in the book.

II. SDMMARY AND CONCLOSIONS
A properly written text should contain more than the
factual information of the discipline. It should provide a
means for the student to evaluate his own progress, and it
should provide a means for the rapid access to the critical
concepts and relationships used ia the discipline. This




DUE TO INABILITY OF THIS DEVICE TO PRINT SUBSCRIPTS
THE FOLLOWING NOTATION MILL BE USED
DESCRIPTION FOR THE ITH FOR THE AIRCRAFT
COMPONENT
Probability of hit P<hi> P<H>
Probability of kill
given a hit P<k/hi> P<K/H>
Probability of kill cf
the ith component
given a hit P<k/Hi>
Probability of kill P<ki> P<K>
probability of
survival P<si> P<S>
Vulnerable area A<vi> A<V>
Presented area A<pi> A<P>
probability of
detection given one






of detection given S





given a single shot P<KSS>
Probability of kill
given multiple encounters P<K/M>
Probability of kill
given a warhead detonation P<K/D>
Probability a fuzed








survives a siagle shot
encounter P<S/E>
Probability an aircraft
survives a sortie P<S/S>
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HOMEWORK PROBLEMS IN SURVIVABILITY
CHAPTER I
1. Define the following terms:
A. Aircraft combat survivability.
B. Aircraft susceptibility.
C. Aircraft vulnerability.
2. List the three general categoriss of susceptibility.
3. If susceptibility = 0.1 and vulnerability = 0.08, what
is the probability of icill and the probability of survival?
4. Describe the goal of the aircraft combat survivability
discipline.
5. List the six vulnerability reduction concepts. List
specific examples of each of the vulnerability reduction
concepts you listed. If you are directly associated with a
military aircraft,
.
attempt to list examples of some of rhe
concepts used on your aircraft.
14

6. List the six susceptibility rsduction concepts, Lisr
examples of the susceptibility reduction concepts you
listed. If you are directly associated with a military
aircraft, attempt to list examples of some of the concepts
used on your aircraft.
7. What agency is responsible for coordinating the indi-
vidual Service programs to increase the combat survivability
of aeronautical systems in a non-nu::lear environment?
8. Briefly describe the purpose and content of NASP.
9. Briefly describe the purpose and content of
MIL-STD-2069(AS) .
10. What is the function of a f oreward-arsa controller
(FAC) ?
11. What is the mission attainment measure (JIAM) a measure
of?
12. What does the survival rate (S) measure?
13. What is the first step in the survivability enhancement
feature selection methodology?




15. At what point in the life cycle of a military aircraft
does survivability become an important consideratior.?
16. What effect on vulnerability did the transition to
turboshaft engines in helicopters have? What other effects
might have to be considered in this transition?





1. A, Survivability: The capability of an aircraft to avoid
and/or withstand a man-made hostile environment.
B. Susceptibility: The inability of an aircraft to avoid
being damaged by the hostile environment.
C. Vulnerability: The inability of an aircraft to with-
stand the damage causedby the hostile environment,
2. The three general categories of susceptibility are:
A. Threat activity
B. Aircraft detection, identification, and tracking.
C. Missile launch or gun firing, propagator flyout
guidance, and warhead impact or detonation.
3. Probability of kill = 0.008
Probability of survival = 0.992
4. The goal of the ACS discipline is the early identifica-
tion and successful incorporation of those specific surviv-
ability enhancement features that increase the effectiveness
of the aircraft as a weapon system.
17

5. The vulnerability reduction con::epts are:
A. Component redundancy
B. Component location
C. Passive damage suppression
D. Active damage suppression
E. Component shielding
F. Component elimination
Examples of the vulnera bili zy rsduction concepts are:
A. Component redundancy
-Multiple engines
-Dual, isolated flight control systems
B. Component location
-Widely separated redundant components
C. Passive damage suppression
-Ballistic tolerance
-Fail-safe response
D. Active damage suppression









-Replace fuel boost pumps with suction feed system
6. The susceptibility reduction concep-cs are:
A. Threat warning





Examples of the susceptibility reduction concepts are:
A. Threat Warning
-Missile launch warning equipment




-Non-reflective paints and coatings
-Secure non-essential emitters prior to












7. The agency responsible for interservice coordination is
the Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft
Survivabiliry. (JTCG/AS).
8. Navair InsTiruction 3920.1, CH-1, "Establishment of Naval
Air Survivability Program (NASP)", establishes aircraft
survivability as a design discipline in the Navy. It
provides the procsedures, responsibilities and relationships
for the NASP within the Naval Air Systems Command.
9. Military standard: "Survivability, Aircraft:
Establishment and Conduct of Programs for."
It provides a standardized systems approach to improve the
survivability of military aircraft.
10. The purpose of the forward air controller is to assist
the combat aircrew in rapid location of its target.
11. The Mission Attainment Measure is a measure of the
ability of the aircraft to accomplish its objective, without
consideration of the threat effects.
20

12. The survival rate is the ratio of the number of aircraft
that return to the number of aircraft launched.
13. The first step in the survival enhancement feature
selection methodology is the mission-threat analysis.
14. Military Standard MIL -STD-2089, "Aircraft Nonnuclear
Survivabiliry Terms" standardizes terminology for the
survivability discipline.
15. A. Often, the first time it is shot at.
B. Ideally, in the early design phase, to eliminate
the necessity of a costly retrofit program
following production.
16. Turboshaft engines increased rhe vulnerability of heli-
copters, because both the turbine engines and their high
speed transmissions were more fragile than the systems they
replaced. Turboshaft engines are lighter, which could
result in a lower gross weight. However, they burn more
fuel, which would require larger fuel tanks. On the other
hand, they burn turbine fuel, which is less easily ignited
than avgas, which could make the aircraft less vulnerable.





1. List the five major aircraft systems. What three flight
essential functions dc these systems provide?
2. List the five other systems foand on most aircraft.
3. What are the major differences between rotary wing
aircraft and fixed wing aircraft?
4. What are the main structural members in the wing and in
the fuselage?
5. What is a keel?
6. Describe semimonocoque construction.
7. List functions that the fuel must sometimes perform in
addition to its obvious function.
8. Why are the fuel and the armament typically located
close to the center of mass of the airplane?
9. Carrier-based aircraft have sevsral structural penalties




10. list the types of turbine engines and the speed ranges
you would ncrnally expect t ham to ba used in.
11. What is the function of tha accessory drive on an
engine?
12. What is dynamic stability?
13. Whar is static stability?
14. List the general types of aircraft in decreaseing order
of stability required.
15. Why are fighter aircraft generally designed to be less
stable than other types of aircraft?
16. Why are transport aircraft generally designed to be very
stable?
17. Can an aircraft that is statically stable be dynamically
unstable? Explain your answer.
18. Define relaxed static stability.
19. Why is artificial fael added to the flight control
systems of aircraft with power boosted or power operated
control surfa::es?
20. List the various control surfaces used on aircraft.




23. What is the purpose of the automatic flight control
system?
2U. What is a "wet wing"? Why are wet wings sometimes used?
25. Why are wet tanks seldom used in the fuselage of
aircraft?
26. Why is the ullage of aircraft fuel tanlcs usually pres-
surized?
27. What is the sump or feed fuel tank?
28. The oxygen subsystem is part of what system?










Lift, thrust, and control are the thrse essential functions
these systems provide.





E. Launch and recovery
3. Helicopters are very power limited and hence must be
very lightly constructed. Thrust, lift, and control are all
provided by the rotor system in helicopters, leading to
25

mechanical complexity in tha controls of the rotor system.
Fuel tanks in helicopters are typically located in the
bottom of the fuselage, necessitating pumping systems to
deliver fuel to the engines ar all times.
U. The main structural members are:
Wing: Spars (spanwise) and ribs (chordwise).
Fuselage: Longerons (lengthwisei and frames
or bulkheads (laterally).
5. A keel is a major fuselage beam running ieng-hwise.
6. Seraimcnocoque construction is a construction technique
which derives significant strength from the skin of the
aircraft.
7. A. Fuel is occassionally used as a coolant, such "as of
the lubricating oil.
B. It is sometimes used as a hydraulic fluid to operate
variable area exhaust nozzles and/or variable inlet guide
vanes.
C. In addition, fuel is quite often the working fluid in
the fuel control and may provide lubrication to the mechan-
ical systems of the fuel control.
26

8. To prevent large shifts in centsr of gravity (eg) during
flight as fuel and especially ordnance are used.
9. Carrier based aircraft generally require:
Folding wings or rotor systems.
More heavily constructed landing gearand supporting
structure.
Provisions for catapault launchand arrested landings
(fixed wing) .
10. The general types of turbine engines and their typical
usages are:
A. Turboshaft Helicopter
B. Turboprop Low to mid subsonic
C. Turbofan Subsonic, with supersonic dash
capability when an afterburner
is used
D. Turbojet High subsonic and supersonic
11. The accessory drive provides power for fuel pumps, elec-
tric generators, hydraulic pumps, fuel control, and variable
area exhaust nozzles and inlet guide vanes.
12. Dynamic stability is a tendency for induced oscillations
to damp out without input to the controls.
27

13. If an aircraft has the initial tendency to move in -^he
direction of its original attitude after displacement, it is
said to have static stability.'
14. The general stability groupings of aircraft are:
A. Transport/cargo aircraft (most stable)
B. Attack/bomber aircraft
C. Fighter/interceptor aircraft (least stable)
15. The more stable an aircraft is, the less agile it is; it
has less abi^lity to maneuver rapidly. Consequenrly, fighrer
aircraft are not designed to be highly stable.
16. As stability is increased, pilot workload goes down,
reducing fatigue on long flights.
17. Yes, if it overshoots its original attitude following a
disturbance by an amount greater than its initial displace-
ment,
18. Relaxed static stability is a design technique which
utilizes a flight control computer to provide artificial
stability to an aircraft which may be so naturally unstable
as to be impossible tc control without the computer.
19. Artificial feel is used to provide tactile warning to













I. Leading and trailing edge flaps
J. Leading edge slats
K. Main rotor blades
L. Tail rotor blades
21. A trim tab is a small tab located a- the trailing edge
of a control surface. It is used to reduce the magnituda of
the control fDrces required to maintain a selected aircraft
attitude,
22. Fly-by-wire is the use of electrical signals to convey
control inputs to servoactuators, eliminating major portions
of the mechanical linkage.
23. The automatic flight control system (AFCS):
A. Augments the aircraft's natural stability.
29

B. Provides automatic commands to hold a pres6lecT:9d
altitude, attitude, and healing.
2U. A wet wing is a fuel tank constructed integrally with
the wing skin. A wet tank maximizes the amount of fuel
which can te stored in a space, since no fuel bladder or
separata tank is required. In addition, a wet tank is often
the only way a thin wing can carry fuel due to the presence
of internal structure.
25. Wet tanks are not used in the fuselage because of
leakage problems.
26. The ullage of fuel tanks is usually pressureized:
A. To assist in fuel transfer.
B. To prevent the fuel from boiling at high altitude.
27. The sump tank is the tank which feeds directly to the
engine.
28. The oxygen subsystem is part of the environmental
control system.
29. The principal control surfaces of a helicopter are its




1. What are the four categories of terminal threat plat-
forms?
2. List the three categories of threat propagators and give
an example of each.
3. What is the largest gun considered a small arm?
4. What is the smallest category of gun that is considered
AAA?
5. What is the counterpart of the conventional warhead for
directed energy weapons?
6. What are the two basic categories of conventional
warheads?
7. What is another name for a non-fuzed warhead?
8. What are the four major types of high explosive
warheads?
9. What damage processes are associated with penetrators?
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10. why is depleted uranium sometimes used for penstrator
cores?
11. What would the principal damage mechanism of a charged
nuclear particle weapon be when directed against an
aircraft?
12. What is the general sequence of events of threat opera-
tions?
13. What is the definition of the maximum target detection
range?
14. What is the definition of maximum effective range of a
weapon?
15. What is lead angle prediction error?
16. What are the most common guidance systems used by todays
missiles?
17. What are the three major types of homing systems used by
todays missiles?
18. What are the most common control laws used by missiles
for navigation?
19. What are the three phases of guidance?
32

20. which phase of guidance requires the highest accuracy
and fastest reaction xime?
21. Describe the major parts of a typical explosive warhead,
22. What basic types of fuzing may be used on projectile and
missile warheads?









D. Directed energy devices
2. The three categories of threat propagators are:
A. Projectiles (7.62mm)
B. Fuzed missiles (SA-6)
«
C. Radiation (high energy lassr)
3. The largest gun considered a small arm is 14.5mm.
U. The smallest gun considered AAA is 20mm.
5. The counterpart of the conventional warhead for directed
energy weapons is the delivered energy disxribution .





7. Nonfused warheads are referred to as penetrator warheads
or kinetic energy penetrators.
8. The four major types of high explosive warheads are;









10. Depleted uranium is 50% more dense than lead, increasing
its ability to penetrate. Uranium is also pyrcphoric,
making it an incendiary warhead.
11. The principal damage mechanism of a charged nuclear
particle weapon would be incapacitation or death of crewmen-
bers.






D. Fire control solution
E. Launch or firing of threat propagator
F. Guidance of a guided propagator
13. Maximum target detection ranga is the maximum range at
which a target can barely be unambiguously discerned.
14. Maximum affective range is tha maximum range at which
the propagator can cause damage to an aircraft.
15. Lead angle prediction error is the projectile miss
distance resulting from errors in the predic-cion of tha
target flight path.















D. Proportional navigation (PROSAV)




20. The terminal phase requires the highest accuracy and
fastest reaction time.




22. The basic fuzing systais are:
A. Contact (superquick and delay)
B. Proximity (VT)
C. Command detonation
23. The essential elements of a mission- threat analysis are:
A. Define the operational mode required by
the specific mission.
B. List the applicable threats and
the threat characteristics.
C. Analyze the aircraft operational modes and the
37

threats and determine the encounter conditions,
D. Use the derived encounter conditions as a basis





1. What are the purposes of combat data analysis?
2. If U73 irombat sorties and 27 tactics training flights
are flown with 11 aircraft lost in combat and one destroyed
on a training flight, what is the combat loss rate?
3. What is the best source of cataloged combat data?
U. If the combat less rate is 2%, what is the probability
of surviving 100 combat missions? If the combat loss rate
is reduced to 1%, what is the probability of surviving 100
combat missions?
5. (TRUE or FALSE) If the XJ-190 has a combat loss rate of
0.1 and the XJ-222 has a combat loss rata of 0.U5, the
XJ-190 must be a more survivable aircraft. Justify your
answer.
6. What are the two major efforts of the Battle Damage
Assessment and Reporting Program (BDARP) ?
7. Describe a loss-cause network.
8. What is one purpose of a loss cause analysis?
39

9. What ar€ the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) loss-cause
categories?
10. Based on recent combat data what are the critical





1. The purposes of combat data analysis are to:
A. Determine the effectiveness of enemy weapon systems
B. Ascertain the survivability of J. S. aircraft
C. Determine the effectiveness of survivability
enhancement techniques.
2. (1000/a73) * (11)=23.2558
The non-combat flights and losses due to ncn-corabat
flights are not considered in the computation.
3. The best source of catalogued combat data is the Combat
Data Information Center, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.
a. P<S> (100 flights) =(P<S> of one flight)**100
(0.98)**100= .1326 = 13.26%
(0.99)**100= .3660 = 36.60%




The intensity of the thraa t must be considered along with
the combat loss rare before a valid comparison of aircraft
can be made.
6. The major efforts of the BDARP are:
A. The collection of combat damage/loss data.
B. The storage, collation, retrieval, and dissemination of
the data through the CDIC.
7. A loss-cause network is a chain of events for all inci-
dents leading to an ultimate loss cause. It shows the
progression of failures from initial damage to the ultimate
loss cause.
8. A Loss-cause analysis can help in the identification of
the critical components of the aircraft.





E. Loss of control
F. Engine failure/loss of thrust




10. Based on combat data, the critical aircraft sysrems are:
A. Fuel sys-em
B. Engine
C. Flight controls S hydraulic systems
D. Lubrication system (helicopters)
E. Main rotor (helicopters)
F. Crew







2. Does vuloerability refer to the aircraft as a whole or
to its individual components?
3. Describe the process of vulnerability redaction.
4. What is the first step in a vulnerability reduction
study?
5. What are the aircraft kill categories?
6. What are the levels of attrition kill and what are their
definitions?
7. Define the term critical compoaent. Give several exam-r
pies of critical components.
8. Why is a special kill level (forced landing kill)
defined for helicopters?
9. What kill level would result from inability of an attack
aircraft to lower its landing gear?
44

10. what are flight essential functions and mission essen-
tial functions?
11. What is a failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA)?
12. Describe two failuras of a gun subsystem on an attack
aircraft, ens of which makes it a critical component for an
attrition kill and ancther which would result in a mission
abort kill.
13. How does the fault tree analysis (FTA) differ from the
failure mode effects analysis ?
lU. Of the FMEA and FTA, which identifies the possibility of
secondary hazards that can be caused by the primary damage
process?
15. What are the fuel system damage-caused failure modes,
and what are some of the techniques which can be used to
prevent or minimize failure?
16. What are the failure modes of the propulsion system?
Suggest some means to prevent them.
17. Whaz are the failure modes of the flight control system,
and what vulnerability reduction techniques can be used?
U5

18. What are the failure modes of the power train and rotor
blade/propeller system? What vulnerability reduction tiachni-
ques can be used?
19. What failure modes are associated with the structural
system and what vulnerability reduction techniques can be
applied?
20. Define the terms redundant and nonredundant when used to
categorize critical components.
21. (TRUE or FALSE) An aircraft with two components which
perform the same function (for instance two flight control
hydraulic systems) is always reiundant in that system.
Explain your answer.
22. If you are associated with a military aircraft, atTsmpt
to list the critical components for your aircraft.
Charactorize each critical component as redundant or nonre-
dundant. Attempt to determine any redundant components which
have failure modes which in fact maJce them nonredundant.
23. What is a Icill tree?
24. What is the kill expression?
25. Restate the six vulnerability reduction concepts.
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26. What are the passive damage suppression techniques?
Give examples of each.
27. What are the two general types of component redundancy?
Give an example of each.
28. How can component location reduce vulnerability?
29. What are some of the techniques of acrive damage
suppression?
30. What is parasitic armor?
31. How can shielding of components be achieved?
32. Describe some component elimination techniques.
33. What is the difference betweaa ballistically tolerant
systems and ballistically resistant systems? Which is
preferred?
34. What specific vulnerability reduction techniques can be
applied to the crew system?
35. You are flying a single seat scout helicopter which has
no redundant components and no critical component overlap.
The following data is applicable frDm one aspect:
critical presented probability of kill
component: area: given a 7.62mm hit:
47

pilot f* sq. ft. 1-0
fu9l tank 17 sq. ft. 0.37
enqine 8 sq. ft. 0.8
tail rotor
qear box 1 sq. ft. 0.6
main rotor
qear box 14 sq. ft. 0.15
fliqht control
hydraulic system 3.2 sq. ft. 0.8
Total presented area of helicopter is 155 sq. ft.
What is the vulnerable area of your aircraft for the qiven
aspect? what is the probability of kill given a hit,
P<K/H>, for your aircraft?
What is the probability of kill, given a hit on the
aircraft, for each individual compoaent (P<k/Hi>) ?
What is the probability of survival, P<S>, given one hit?
What is the probability of survival, P<S>, given ten hits?
36. How does the additional of a redundant component alter
the computation of vulnerable area, given a single hit?
U8

Consider the scout helicopter in the previous question. It
has been retrofitted to a dual sngine conf iguratior. to
enhance its survivability. The only change is the addition
of another engine, also 8 sq. ft. in area. There is no
component overlap. What is the probability of Jcill given a
single hit P<K/H> now?
37. Consider a light attack aircraft with a digital fly-by-
wire flight control sysreia. The following data is available
on critical components.
critical presented probability of kill,
component: area: given a 7.62mm hit:
pilot 4. sq. ft. 1.0
fuel system 52.0 sq- ft. 0.26
engine 40.0 sq. ft. 0.6
flight control
computer 3.0 sq. ft. 0.7
The flight control computer completely overlaps the fuel
tank. What is the vulnerable area of the aircraft?







FUEL TANK #1 ENGINE/#2 ENGINE
HYDRAOLIC PUMP #1 HID3ET/#2 WIDG£T/#3 WIDGET
THINGUS (Kill will result if any rvo of
three widgets are killed)
39. Draw the kill tree for the heli^oprer in problem 39.
UO. Briefly describe several of the techniques used to eval-
uate vulnerability to internally detonating warheads.
U1. What are the damage mechanisms associated with exter-
nally detonating warheads?
U2. Your aircraft is subjected to an external warhead burst,
and 87 penetrators strike your aircraft. Each penetrator has
a probability of kill given a hit of 0.02. What is your
probability of survival? Work the problem two ways and
compare your answers. Assume that the effect of each pene-
trator is independent of the others.
43. What variables must be considered in the evaluation of
externally detonating warheads to accurately predict the
probability of aircraft kill?
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UU, what are the major categories of computer programs for
vulnerability assessment?
45. What is an Endgame program?
U6. What two methods can be used to compute ths probability
of kill of aa aircraft with redundant components, given
multiple hits?
U7. Given the kill transition matrix in this chapter, what
is the probability of kill given one hit? Given ten hits?
Given twenty- five hits? (A programmable calculator or
computer solution is highly recommsn dad.
)
U8. What are the measures of vulnerability?
49. If the XB-ia8 has a probability of kill given a hit of
0.1 and the X3-888 has a probability of kill given a hit of
0.17, which is more vulnerable? Explain your answer.
50- What itsms of information are nacessary to conduct a
vulnerability assessment?
51. What are the three component kill criteria?




53. List and briafly describe the cDmputer programs known as
vulnerable araa routines.
5U. Lis- and briefly describe the computer programs known as
Endgame programs.
55. Compute the vulnerability of a redundant component A/C.
A. Consider a single engine helicopter that has five crit-
ical components that are vulnerable to a 12.7mm API projec-
tile. These components are two fusl tanks^ the pilot, the
engine, the tail rotor/drive shaft. Assume that these five
components are non- redundant and have the following charac-
teristics:
COMPONENT PRESENTED AREA • P<K/H>
Fuel Tank #1 10 sq. ft. 0.2
Fuel Tank #2 8 sq. ft. 1.0
Tail Rotor/Drive 10 sq. ft. 1.0




The total presented area of the helicopter is
is 200 sq. ft.
Compute the vulnerable area
and the P<K/H> of the aircraft.
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B. Suppose a cross-ever feed systsm is added, making the
fuel tanks redundant components, compute the probability ths
aircraft is killed after taking one hit, after three hits,
after six hits and after ten hits. Plot the cumulative prob-
ability of kill versus the number of hits.
C. Plot the number of aircraft saved in 1000 sorties because
of this modification. Assume each sortie consists of one
hit, of three hits, of six hits, and of ten hits.
56. You are the pilot of a single engine attack aircraft
which has two cockpit positions. You have five critical
components vulnerable to 50 cal. API projectiles. These
components are two pilots, the engine, flight control
computer, and a fuel tank which straddles the engine inlet
duct. The following data is pertinent:
COMPONENT PRESENTED AREA PROBABILITY OF KILL,
GIVEN A HIT ON THE
COMPONENT
PILOT #1 a.O sq. ft. 1-0
PILOT #2 U.O sq- ft. 1.0
ENGINE 16-0 sq. ft. 0.6
FUEL TANK 22.0 sq . ft- 0-3
FLIGHT CONTROL
COMPUTER 3.0 sq. ft. 0.9
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Total presented area is 185.0 sq. ft.
Develop the transition matrix and evaluate probability of
kill of the aircraft for one, five, and ten hits.
It has been proposed that the aircraft be operated single
piloted. Comment on the benefits and costs given one, five,





1. Vulnerability refers to the inability of an aircraft to
withstand one or more hits by the various damage
mechanisms-to its liability to daaage or destruction when
hit by enemy fire.
2. Vulnerability refers both to the individual components
and to the aircraft as a whole. Each component contributes
in some measure to the overall vulnerability of the
aircraft.
3. Vulnerability reduction is the reduction of the likely-
hood that one or more of the critical components of the
aircraft will be killed if the aircraft is hit.
4. The first step in a vulnerability reduction study is the
identification of those components whose damage or loss
could lead to an aircraft kill.
5. The aircraft kill categories are:
A. Attrition kill
B. Mission abort kill
C. Forced landing kill
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6. The attrition kill levels are;
A. KK kill - Damage that will cause an aircraft
to fall out of control immediately upon being hit.
B. K kill - Damage that causes an aircraft to fall out
of control within 30 seconds after being hit.
C. A kill - Damage that causes an aircraft to fall out
of control within 5 minutes afiiar being hit.
D. B kill - Damage that causes an aircraft to fall out
of control within 30 minutes after being hit.
7. A critical component is a component which, if damaged or
destroyed, would yield a defined or definable aircraft kill
level. Examples: Pilot, engine, flight control system, etc.
for an A kill.
8. The ability of a helicopter to safely land with a
variety of damage modes which would cause a fixed wing
aircraft to be lost requires the spscial forced landing kill
level to te defined for helicopters. These modes include
(but are not limited to) loss of engine power, massive fuel
leakage, difficulty in operating controls, and slow leakage




9. The inability of an aircraft to lower its landing gsar
would rasult in an attrition kill due to its inability to
land without major damage.
10. Flight essential functions are those system and
subsystem functions required to enable an aircraft to
sustain controlled flight. Mission essential functions are
those system and subsystem functions required to enable an
aircraft to perform its designated mission.
11. An FMEA is a proceedure that (1) identifies and docu-
ments all failure modes of a component or subsystem and (2)
determines the effects of each failure mode upon the capa-
bility of the system or subsystem to perform its essential
functions.
12. An attrition kill might result if penetration of the
ammunition drum by an API projectile caused detonation of
ammunition in the drum, resulting in major structural
damage. Mission abort kill might result if the drum was
distorted enough to prevent ammunition from feeding.
13. An FMEA is a bottcm-up approach. Failure of a component
is assumed (for instance, loss of the flight control
hydraulic actuator) and the consequsnces of that failure are




A fault tree analysis is a top-down approach. The undesired
event is defined, then the events and/cr combinations of
events that can result in that event are identified. (Loss
of control is defined, and loss of the flight control
hydraulic actuator is identified as a potential cause.)































-Drain holes to allow leaked
fuel to escape










-Maximize volume of fuel
in tanks
-Provide smooth, simple
contours for fuel tank walls















-Avoid direct fuel tank/inlet
interface
-Use fuel from tanks near
inlets before entering combat
-Avoid direct fuel tank/inlet
interface
-Use ballistically tolerant
materials which yield little
or no debris to form ducts
-use fuel from tanks near
inlets before entering combat




-Minimize presented area of
lubrication system components
-Use self sealing or
ballistically tolerant
components





A. Disruption of control
signal path
B. Loss of control
power
C. Loss of aircraft
motion sensor data
D. Damage to control









-Minimize presented area of

















18. Power train 5 propeller/
rotor blade system
failure modes
A. Loss of lubrication
surfaces and hinges
Multiple hinges
Alternate sources of control
(flaps as backup roll control)
Fail-safe surfaces
(lock to level fligh-c
vice hardover)
Use less flamabla hydraulic
fluid
minimize leakage
use iDwar pressure systems
(less atomization of fluid)




-Minimize vulnerable area of
lubrication system
-self sealing tanks and lines




B. Mecanical/structural -Ballistically tolerant drive









The techniques used to minimize damage are:
A. Multiple load paths
B. Fail safe design
C. Crack stoppers
20. A nonredundant component is a component, the damage or
loss of which will result in the loss of an essential func-
tion such as lift, thrust, etc.
A redundant component is a component, the damage or loss of
which will not result in the loss of an essential function.
21. FALSE. If, for instance, both hydraulic systems are fed
from a ccmmcn reservoir, loss of one system due to a leak
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and subsequent loss cf fluid would result in th-s loss of
both hydraulic systems,
22. (Various)
23. a kill tree is a visual illustration of the critical
components of an aircraft and the contributions of component
redundancy.
24. The kill expression is a logical s-ateinent using the
logical (.AND.) and (.OR.) statements to convey the same
critical component and redundancy information that the kill
tree contains.
25. The vulnerability redaction concepts are:
A. Component redundancy
B. Component relocation
C. Passive damage suppression
D. Active damage suppression
E. Component shielding
F. component elimination







27. Th€ two general types of component redundancy are:
A. Total redundancy, such as dual flight
control hydraulic systems.
B. Partial redundancy, such as use of differential
flaps as baclcup roll conxrol devices.
28. Component location can reduce vulnerability in the
following ways:
A. Non-critical components can be positioned to
shield critical components.
B. Redundant components can be widely separated to
insure single hit redundancy.
C. Critical components can be overlapped or tightly
grouped to minimize the presented vulnerable area.
D. Components can be isolated to reduce the possibility
of cascading dmage.
29. The following are examples of active damage suppression
techniques:
A. Fire detection and extinguishing systems.
B. Alerting systems which can warn of low fluid levels,
etc. in time to allow securing of the system
without damage.
C. Hydraulic fuses which can isolate a leaking portion
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of a system without requiring that the entira
system be secured.
30. Parasitic armor is armor which does not contribute to
the structural strength of the aircraft.
31. Components can be shielded by:




32. Some component elimir.ation techniques are:
A. Replace fuel boost pumps with a suction feed system.
B. Replace oil pumps and coolers with a grease
lubrication system.
C. Use manual flight controls vice power
boosted systems.
D. Use fly-by-wire or optics vice mechanical pushrods.
E. Jetison external fuel tanks prior to entering combat
to lower vulnerable area and improve performance.
33. A ballistically resistant system is one designed to
"repel" the damage mechanism, as armor would. A balisti-
cally tolerant system is one designed to "bend" with the
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damage and still operate. For example, large diameter, thin
walled control rods. Ballistic -colerance is usually to be
preferred, since it will often achieve the same result with
a significantly lower weight penelty.
3U, The following vulnerability reduction techniques can be
applied to The craw system:
A. Shield the crew using components or armor.
B. Provide ventilation/oxygen to minimize the
effects of smoke and toxic fumes.
C. Reduce pilot workload which rfould distract the pilot
from combat mission performance.
35. component presented probability of vulnerable
area kill, given area <A/vi>
a hit P<k/hi>
pilot 4.0 sq. ft. 1.0 4.0 sq. ft.
fuel 17.0 sq. ft. 0.37 6.3 sq. ft.
engine 8.0 sq. ft. 0.8 6.4 sq. ft.
TEGB 1.0 sq. ft- 0.6 0.6 sq. ft.
MRGB 14.0 sq. ft. 0.15 2.1 sq. ft.
fit
controls 3.2 sq. ft. 0.8 2.56 sq. ft.
Vulnerable area A<V> = 21.95 sq. ft.
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Aircraft probability of kill given a hit
P<K/H>=(21.9 5) /(155) =0. 1416
Component probability of kill given a hit P<k/hi>
pilot: A<vi>= 4/155 = 0.025806
fuel sys: A<vi>= 6.29/155 = 0.040580
engine: A<vi>= 6.4/155 = 0.041290
TRG3: A<vi>= 0.6/155 = 0.00387
MRGB: A<vi>= 2.1/155 = 0.01355
fit. controls: A<vi>= 2.56/155 - 0.01652
Probability of survival given one hit
P<S>=(1-P<K>)=( 1-0. 1416 0) =0.8584
Probability of survival, given 10 hits:
P<S> = (1-?<K>) **10=0.2 1722
36. The redundant components do not contribute to the vuln-
erable area for a single hit if there is no overlap of
redundant components.




37. A<vi>(pilot) = U. 0*1.0 = 4.0 sq. ft.
A<vi>(engine) = 40.0*0.6 = 2U.0 sq. ft.
A<vi>(fuel tank) = (52. 0-3.0) *0. 26 = 12.74 sq. ft.
The area of the flight control computer is subrtacted from
the area the fuel tark, since any shotline through zhis area
will result in kill due to the vulnerability of the flight
control computer.
38. The kill expression is:
(PILOT .AND. COPILOT) .02. (DRIVE TRAIN) .OR.
(FUEL TANK) .OR. (#1 ENGINE .AND. #2 ENGINE) .OR.
(HYDRAULIC PUMP) .OR. (WIDGET #1 .AND. WIDGET #2 ) .OR.
(WIDGET #2 .AND. WIDGET #3) .OR. (WIDGET #1 .AND.
WIDGET #3) .OR. (THINGUS).
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UO. Two techniques to evaluate vulnerability to internally
detonating warheads are:
A. Treat the HE round as a penetrrator but use an expanded




B. Tha point burst approach involTss dividing tha aircraft
into various segments and evaluating the probability cf kill
given detonation in each segment. The probability of kill
given a hit is the product of the probability of kill given
a hit for each segment times the probability cf hitzing that
segment,





42. P<S> = (1-P<K>) **n
P<S> = (1-.02) **87
P<S> = (.9 8) **87
P<S> = 0.1725
Alternatively, using the approximation,
P<S> = 1-(1-P<K/H>) **n = 1-exp (-n*P<K/H>)
P<S> = (approximately) 1-exp(-a*P<K/H>)
P<S> = (approximately) exp (-87* (0.02) )
P<S> = (approximately) 0.1775
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43. The following must be considered in a missile/aircraft
encounter:
A. Fragment static velocity




F. Encounter geometry (tailchase? head on?)
Uti, The major categories of computer programs for vulner-
ability assessment are:
A. Shotlina generators
B- Vulnerable area routines
C. Internal burst routines
D. Endgame programs
U5. An Endgame program describes an encounter between an
aircraft and an HE warhead with a proximity fuze.
U6. The two methods used to compute probability of kill of
an aircraft with redundant components given multiple hits
are:
A. The kill tree diagram
B. The state transition matrix
U7. Probability of kill, given one hit:
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0.0733 +0.0 = 0.0733
Probability of kill, given ten hits:
O.U5a42 * 0.0307515 = 0.76194
Probability cf kill, given twenty-five hits:
0.550599 + 0.435863 = 0.98646
48. The measures of vulnerability are -che vulnerable area
and the probability cf kill given a hit or detonation.
49. Probability of kill given a hir is the measure of
vulnerability, but no valid comparison can be made useing
these values. The vulnerable area of each aircraft must also
be compared. An aircraft which has a low probability of
kill given a hit and a relatively Large presented area may
in fact be more vulnerable (have a larger vulnerable area)
than an aircraft with a higher probability of kill given a
hit with a smaller vulnerable area.
50. A vulnerability assessment requires:
A. A selection of the aircraft kill levels or
categories to be assessed.
B. An assembly of the technical and functional
descriptions of the aircraft.
C. A determination of the critical components
of the aircraft.




E. A deter minaticn of the type and aramount of damag*?
requirad to kill each componsnt.
F. The computation of the appropriate vulnerabilixy
measurss for the components and for the
the aircraft based on the threat selected.
51. The three component kill criteria are:
A. Probability of component kill given a hit
B. The area removal criterion
C. The energy density criterion
52. The shotline generators are:
A. MAGIC - Uses combinatorial geometry and basic body
shapes (boxes, spheres, etc) to
model component geometries.
B. GIFT - An improved MAGIC with simpler input and
more efficient computation.
C- SHOTGEN - Similar to MAGIC but uses flat triangular
patches to model component surfaces.
D. FASTGEN - A more recent version of SHOTGEN.
53. The detailed vulnerable area routines are:
A. VAREA - Conducts vulnerability analyses of systems
subjected to single ftagments and penetrators.
B. VAEEA02 -Evolved from VAREA, adding a
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penetration mode, an air gap fire model,
and a redundant components m3del.
C. COVART - Adds helicopter vulnerable area routines
to VAHEA02 and includes a battle damage
damage repair time model.
A simplified detailed area routine exists:
D. CCMVAT - A vulnerable area routine which uses
average shielding values for components
vice shotlines,
54. The Endgame programs are:
A. SESTSM II - Evaluates the terminal effects of a
non-nucluar missiles against aerial targets. Computes
with respect to a direct hit, fragment damage,
and blast.
B. SCAN - Predicts the probability that an aircraft
will survive an attack by a missile armed with a
warhead. Allows various fragment sizes and shapes.
Has graphics capabilities for evaluation of
input and output data.
C. ATTACK - Predicts the ability of a missile to attack




D, REFMOD (MECA) - Allows selection of warhead typa
and fuze routines. Components are modeled by
various geometrical shapes.
55.
A. COMPONENT PRESENTED PROBABILITY OF VULNERABLE
AREA KILL, GIVEN A AREA
A (pi) HIT (P<K/hi> A<vi>
#1 FUEL TANK 10 sq. ft. 0.2 2 sq . ft.
#2 FUEL TANK 8 sq. ft. 1.0 8 sq. ft.
TAIL/ROTOR
DRIVE 10 sq. ft. 1.0 10 sq. ft.
PILOT U sq. ft. 1.0 a sq. ft.
ENGINE 12 sq. ft. 0.5 6 sq. ft.
Vulnerable area (total) =30 sq. fr.
P<K/H> = 0.15 = (200 sq. ft.)/(30 sq. ft.)
B. Transition matrix symbols used:
KNRC = Probability of kill of a non-redundant component
KFT1 = Probability of kill of #1 fusl tank
KFT2 = Probability of kill of #2 fuel tank
KFT = Probability of kill cf both fuel tanks
NK ' Probability of no kill
TRANSITION MATRIX - REDUNDANT AIRCRAFT
76









C. Aircraft saved per 1000 sorties iue
to fuel system change:






56. COaPONENI a<Pi> P<K/hi> A<Vi> P<K/Hi>
(sq. ft.) (sq. ft.) (AIRCRAFT)





COMPUTER 3.0 0.9 2.7 0.0145946
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REDUNDANT NON-R








Vulnerable area = 26-9 sq- ft.
Probability of kill given a hit = 0,14540540
185 - 26.9 = 158.1 sq. ft.
185 - 49 = 135 sq. ft.
B. Transition matrix symbols used:
Kpl = Probability of kill of pilot no. 1
Kp2 = Probability of kill of pilot no. 2
Knrc = Probability of kill of a non-redundant component
Krc = Probability of kill of a redundant componant
Nk = Probability of no kill
TRANSITION MATRIX USED:
Knrc Kpl Kp2 Krc Nk





For one hit, P<K> = 0.10216
For five hits, P<K> = .415782 * 7.07884E-3 = 0.42286
For ten hits, P<K> = -653718 + 2.055063-2 = 0-67427
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For the case where the aircraft is flown single piloted
COMPONENT A<Pi> P<K/hi> A<Vi>
(sq. ft.) (sg. ft.)
PILOT #1 4.0 1.0 4.0
ENGINE 16.0 0.6 9.6
FUEL TANK 22.0 0.3 6.6
FLT. CONT.
CONPUTER 3.0 0.9 2.7
Total presented area is still 135.0 sg. ft,
Total vulnerable ares is 22.9 sq. ft.
P<K/Hi> = 22.9 / 185 = .1238
For one hit, P<K/H> = 0.12373
For two hits, P<K/H> = 0.48352
For ten hits, P<K/H> = 0.73325
P<S> = 0.87622
P<S> = 0. 51648









































































For each additional pilot lost, one additional aircraft
returns from the mission.




1. What is a measure of susceptibility, and what major
items is it dependent upon?
2. What are the important features of the threat?
3. What important factors are associated with the aircraft
in an encounter with a threat?
4. What is a susceptibility assessment? What categories
does it divide events into?
5. What is the purpose of an esseatial elements of assess-
ment (EEA) ?
6. Define aircraft signatures and list those mentioned in
the text.
7. What must be considered in addition to the aircraft
signatures when evaluating the ability to detect or track an
aircraft?
8. What is radar cross section? How is it expressed?
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9. What basic relationships can be formulated between
aircraft size and radar cross section?
10. What variables affect the RCS of an aircraft?
11. What is perhaps the most important design feature to
avoid in designing an aircraft to minimize RCS?
12. What is target glint?
13. What "problem areas" require a great deal of attention
from the standpoint of minimizing 533?
1U. What methods are available to determine radar cross
section?
15. Where would you most probably be able to find tabulated
ECS data for aircraft?
16. What are the major sources of infrared radiation from
aircraft?
17. What part of the elec tormagnetic spectrum encompasses
infrared radiation?
18. What determines the frequency of the peak IS radiation
emitted by a solid body?
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19- If the afterburner of your aircraft increases the tail
pipe temperature by a factor of two, what does this do to
the intensity of IR radiation from the tail pipe?
20. What are the main contributers to the IR signature of
the exhaust plume? What is the major contributor? At what
wavelength?
21. What is the best source of D3D infrared and electro-
optical information?
22. What are the visual observablas? Why are visual signa-
tures important?
23. What are ths four parameters that influence detecti-
bility of vi:5ual signatures? Define them.
2U. What factors influence the aural detectibility of an
aircraft?
25. What are the principal sources Df aircraft noise?
26. What is the "end product" or desired information derived
by an aircraft detection and tracking system?
27. You are flying thirty kilometers from a fire control
radar mounted four meters above the ground. At what altitude




28. In the radar range equation, what variables does the
aircraft designer have control over? What is the functional
relationship between detection range and these variables?
29. If you succeed in doubling the system noise of a radar
via electronic countermeaseures, by what amount do you
decrease detection range? What would you have to do to
system noise to halve the detection range?
30. What is the maximum unambiguous range im meters of a
radar with a pulse repetition rate (PRF) of 10,000?
31. What is the probability of detection of an aircraft
scanned ten times by a radar system if the probability of
detection is 0.4 for each scan?
32. What general characteristics would you expect a search
radar to have?
33. What general characteristics would you expect a fire
control radar to have?
34. What are the general techniques used by fire control
(weapon control) radars to track in azimuth?
35. What is the "probable error" of a radar system?
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36. What are the "systsmatic errors" of a radar system?
What sources of random errors degrade radar tracking accu-
racy?
37. What factors in the lock-on range equation for an
infrared detector does the aircraft designer/user have some
control over? What are the functional relationships?
38. You have selected aft^erburner in your aircraft to more
rapidly depart the combat zone. Your exhaust plume is 1.6
times its former temperature. Horf has your IR detection
range been affected?
39. What techniques are used by IR seekers to track targets?
UO. What is a visually directed weapon system? List some
examples of visually directed weapon systems.
U1. Where are theoretical studies of detection and tracking
by human operators using visual tracking devices conducted?
U2. What is attenuation of IR radiation?
U3. What radar system deceptive coun termeasures are used?
44. What are expendables? How are they used and how do they
work?
45. What is a radar noise jammer? Describe the three types.
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us. What are the factors that impose practical limits on
radar and IR detection range?
a7. You are designing a fire control radar for a mobile gun
system which must have a maximum unambiguous range of ten
kilometers You must also have a range resolution of of ten
meters, and you are limited (by yoar cooling system) to an
average power of ten watts. Specify the maximum pulse
repetition frequency and maximum pulse length you can use.
What will your peak power be?
U8. As an aircraft designer, you inadvertently created a
triangular corner reflector by using a radar transparent
bomb bay door to cover a rectangular metal bomb bay, which
has a characteristic dimension of 60 cm. What is the radar
cross section of this area to a 3 cm radar?
49. What is the maximum pulse repetition frequency that can
be used on an air search radar which must have an unambig-
uous range of 150 nautical miles? What duty cycle would
result if your minimum detection range was five miles? If




50. You are trying to develop a radar to warn of incomeing
AAA, and you decide that to get adaguate return you must use
a wavelength of 0-8 cm. What would the operating frequency




1. A measure of susceptability is probability of hit, P<H>,








3. The important factors associated with the aircraft in an
encounter with a threat are:
A. Aircraft observables or detartable signatures
B. Countermeasures used
C. Aircraft performance capabilities
U. A susceptibility assessment is a modeling of the
sequence of events and elements in the aircraft/threat
encounter until a hit on the aircraft occurs. The events can
be divided into two categories:
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5. Tha purpose of an EEA is to determine which of the
features or elements of an aircraft/threat encounter are
important and which can be eliminated from the assessment.
A. Detection/trac king/fire control doctrine/launch &
guidance of missiles or firing of AAA projectiles, or firing
of radiation beams, (Simulation or flyout model)
E. Detonation/impact of warhead/penetrator or radiation,
(Includes terminal encounter geometry, fuzing capability S
logic, damage mechanism generation and propagation,)
6. Aircraft signatures are those characteristics that can
be used by the threat systems for detection and tracking.







7. In addition to aircraft signatures, any intentional or
inadvertant emissions from the aircraft can be important,
especially for detection.




A. Voice or data transi mission via radio
B. Navigation radar
C. TACAN (Tactical Air Navigation)
D. Aircraft lights
8. Radar cross section is a measara of the amount of rhe
incident radar signal which is rsflactsd toward the
receiving antsnna. It is expressed in either area (square
meters) or in decibels (dB) , usually refersnced to one
square meter.
9. No simple relationship can be stated to correlate
aircraft size and radar cross section.
10. The .following variables affect radar cross section:
A. Aircraft size




F. Wave length of incident radar signal
G. Polarization of incident radar signal
11. The corner reflector behaves very much like a mirror to
radar waves over a large range of aspect angles and henca
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should be avoided whenever possible. In particular, th9
thr^e corner right angle ra flector is capable of rexurning a
radar signal over an extremely large range of aspect angles.
A single three corner reflector can display a very high RCS
over one eighth of the entire aspecr of the aircraft.
12. Target glint, also known as bright spot wander, is the
motion of the aparent centroid of the RCS about the aircraft
as the aspect angle varies slightly. It is caused by
constructive and destructive interference of the individual
radar echos returning from the various surfaces of the
aircraft.
13. The areas which require a great deal of attention to
reduce radar cross section are:
A. Bomb bays
B. Jet engine inlets and nozzles
C. Fuselage-wing intersections
D. Fuselage- empenage intersections
E. Wing-pylon intersections
F. Cockpit
G. Antennas and antenna compar-cments
H. Main and tail rotor heads
I. Bomb bay door-fuselage intersections
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14. there are several methods to determine radar cross
section:
A. Analytic computation (exact solution)
B. Analytic solution of a mathematically
simplified model
C. Experiaental measurement usiag flight test aircraft
D. Static testing of full size aircraft
E. Static testing of reduced size models
15. One of the most complete collections of RCS da-a is the
Air Force Electronic Warfare Center (AFEWC) , Kelly AFB, San
Antonio, Texas.
16. The major sources of infrared radiation 'from aircraft
are:
A. Hot parts of airframe and pr::pulsion system
B. Reflected solar radiation
C. Hot engine exhaust plume
17. Infrared radiation occurs in the electromagnetic spec-
trum at 0.77 to 1000 microns-
18. The freguency of the peak IR radiation is a function of
the temperature of the radiating body.
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19. The intensity of the total radiation emitted from a body
is a function of temperature raised to the fourth power.
Power = f(T**4), therefore, (2**a = 16) you are emitting 16
times as much IR power.
20- The main contributors to the IR signature of the exhaust
plume are water vapor and carbon dioxide. The carbon dioxide
is the major contributor and radiatss at a wavelength of U.2
to 4 . 7 microns.
21. The best source of DOD IR and electro-optical informa-
tion is the Infrared Information and Analysis Center (IRIA)
,
Environmental research institute of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
Michigan.




D. Engine exhaust glow
Often these observables can be seen befor the aircraft
itself is visible, allowing additional optical tracking time
to arrive at a fire control solution.
23. The four parameters that influence dexectibility are:
A. LUMINANCE: the radiance or power per unit solid
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angle per unit area of an object weighted by
the luminosity funcrion of a standard obssrver.
3. CHROMATICITY: the chromatic contrast of a body,
irrespective of its luminance. A light blue aircraft
seen against white clouds might have rhe same
luminance as the clouds, but caa be easily seen,
because of the difference in chroma ticity.
C. CLUTTER: the changing visual bachground makes an
aircraft more easily seen.
D. MOVEMENT: the motion of an aircraft
,
particylarly
that of rotor blades, can be an important factor
in detectibility of aircraft,
24. The aural detectibility of an aircraft is influenced by;
A. The intensity and spectrum of noise generated
B. The spatial pattern of noise radiation
C. The distance between aircraft and observer
D. Atmospheric refraction and scattering effects
E. The level and spectrum of background noise
near the observer
25. The principal sources of aircraft noise are:
A- Propeller/rotor blade rotational and vertex noises
B. Engine inlet/exhause noises
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C. Engine combustion/rotary noisss
D. Airfraaie aerodynamic noisss
26. The end product of aircraft datection and tracking is a
relatively accurate determination of the aircraft's location
in azimuth, elevation, velocity, range and heading as a
function of time-
27. Radar horizon = 6.5* ((h<ant>) **3 . 5 + (h<ac>) **0. 5)
ht of aircraft = (R<H>/6,5 - ( (h<aat>) **0. 5) **2
ht of aircraft = (30/6.5 - 2) **2
You must fly below 6.8 meters above the ground
to avoid detection.
28. The aircraft designer has some control over radar cross sec-ion
(ECS) through design considerations
and radar system noise (N)
via electronic count ermeasures
.
Range = f ( (RCS) **.25, (1/N)**.25)
29. Doubling system noise reduces maximum detection range by
a factor of 0. 8U
.
Range = f ( (1/N) **.25) - (1/2)**. 25 = 0,8409
To solve for noise to halve maximum detection range, solve
the functional relationship for noise:
range = f ( (1/N)**. 25)
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0.5 = f ((1/N) **.25
N = 16
You must increase system noise by a factor of 16 to halve
detection range.
30. Given a PRF of 10,000, the maximum unambiguous range of
a radar is:
R<u> = c/(2*PRP)
R<u> = 3.0**108 m/s / 20,000 pps
R<u> = 15,000 meters
R<u> = 15 kilometers
31. The cumulative probability of datacticn for ten scans is
one minus the product of the probabilities that the aircraft
will not be detected on each scan.
P<cd>(S) = 1-(1-P<ds) **S
P<cd> = 1- (1-0.4)**10 = 1-(0.6)**10 = 1-(0.0060) = 0.99U0
32. A search radar would have:
A. Long range (implies low PRF)
B. High power (long pulse, implies
poor range resolution)
C. Low antenna rotation rate (tD put many pulses on
the target to maximize the probability
of detection)
D. Ability to track many targets at one rime
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33. A fire control radar would hava:
A. Relatively short range (high prf)
B. High aagular resolution
C. Short pulses (good range resolution)
D. Track few (or one) targets at a time
E. May use doppler tracking




C. Track while scan
35. Probable error is the magnituds of that deviation error
such that one half of the srrors are larger and one half of
the errors are smaller than the probable error.










37. The designer/operator of the aircraft has some control
over the IR signature.
Lock on range = f(IR signature ( watts/stearadian) ) **0.5
38. Increaseing your exhaust plume temperature by a factor
of 1.6 will increase your detection range by a factor of
1.265.
R (lo) = f(P(i))**0.5 = (1.6)**0.5 = 1.2649






2. Crossed array trackers
3. Raster trackers
4. Rotating linear arrays
40. & visually directed weapon system is one which uses the
human eye as either a primary or backup detection or
guidance system.
Some examples are:




C. Electro-optical imaging equipment, such as
low light level tv.
41. Studies using human trackers are conducted at: The Air
Force Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory,
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio,
42. Attenuation is the decrease in intensity of IR radiation
between the emitter and the detector. It. is a function of
both spherical spreading ( 1/r**2) and reflection, scat-
tering, and absorption by gasses and water droplets in the
atmosphere.
43. There are four basic categories of DECM techniques:
A. Time Modulated DECM
1. Range-Gate Pull-Off
2. Multiple False Targets
B. Amplitude Modulation DECM
1. Countdown
2. Cover Pulse
3. Scan Rate Modulation
a. Inverse Conscan






44. Expendables are IE flares, chaff, and other materials or
devices (possibly including small missiles) released,
dropped, or launched from aircraft in an attempt to prevent
lock-on or break lock-on of a seeker. They work, in the
general sense, by attracting attention to themselves and
consequently away from the aircraft. Chaff can also be used
to screen the movement of aircraft which follow the chaff-
laying aircraft.
U5. A noise jammer is a device whirh transmits enough power
to drown oat the aircraft echg on the radar scope.
The three basic types are:
A. Barrage or broad-band jammers
B. Spot jammers (en a narrow frequency band)
C. Swept jammers
46. Factors which limit the detection range of both radar
and IB devices are:
A. Seeker sensitivity
B. Atmospheric losses





47. PULSE REPETITION FREQUENCY
R<u> = c/(2*f<r>) ===> f<r> = ::/(2*R<u>)
f<r> = (300, OOOkm/sec) /2*(10]cm) =15,000 pps
RANGE RESOLUTION
Delta R = (c*tau)/2
(tau = pulse width)
2*(10 m) = (300,000,000 m/sec) * tau
tau = 6.67*10**-8 sec
DUTY CYCLE = PULSE WIDTH * PULSE REPETITION FREQUENCY
Duty cycle = (6. 67*10**-8) *( 15, 300) = 0.00100
Pavg = Ppealc*(duty cycle)
Ppeak = Pavg/duty cycle = 10/0.00100 = 10,000 wat^s
U8. Radar cross section for a triangular reflector
RCS = 4*(pi)*(L) **a/3*(tfave length) **2
RCS = 4*(3. 1415) *(60) **4/3*(3**2)
RCS = 6,03 1,858 square centimeters
RCS = 603 square meters !!!!!
49. Maximum unambiguous range = c/(2*prf) = Ru
prf = c/(2*Ru) = 186,000 mi/sec / 300 mi = 620 pps
Minimum detection range = Delta R = c*tau/2
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tau = 2*5 mi/186,000 mi/ssc = 5.38*10**-5 sec
Duty cycle = Du = prf*tau = 620* (5.38*1 0**-5) = 0.0333
Average power = peak power * duty cycle
Average power = (10**6 watts) * (0.0333) = 33,300 watts
50. Lambda (wavelength) = c/f




1. Define aircraft ccmbat survivability.
2. How is a survivability assessment psrformed?
3. What are the commonly used measures of survivability?
4. What are the basic elements of a scenario?
5. Of the following, identify those items used to compute
P<KSS>.
-Environmental conditions
-Probability threat is active
-Probability of detection
-Probability aircraft is within range of threat
-Ability of fire control/guidance system to direct the
propagator against the aircraft
-Number of propagators launched/fired
-Fuzing employed (if any)
-Aircraft vulnerability




7. Whax are the elements of the probability an aircraft
survives an encounter with a single threat (?<S/E>) ?
8. Two hostile encounters take place - one between an
aircraft and a AAA battery, another between an aircraft and
a SAM site. Determine which encounter the aircraft is more
likely to survive, given the following encounter conditions.
ENCOUNTER A (AIRCRAFT VS SAM)
Cumulative probability of detection 0.72
Probability of launch/fire , 0.50
Probability of kill given a single shot 0.88
The site can launch a total of four missiles.
ENCOUNTER 3 (AIRCRAFT VS AAA)
Cumulative probability of detection 0.6 1
Probability of launch/fire 1.00
Probability of kill given a single shot 0.003
Number of shots fired 820
9. What are the principal elements of the computation of
sortie survivability?
10. Validate the approximation for sortie survivability by




M = number of encountsrs = 20
N = number of shots fired per encounter = 50
P<Di> = probability of detection for each encounter
P<Di> = 0. 90
P<Li> = probability of launch for sach encounter
P<Li> = 0.80
P<KSSi> = Probability of kill for a single shot for
each encounter
P<KSSi> = 0. 001
Is the apprcximaiton still valid if N = 4 and P<KSSi> = 0.7?
What if N = U , M = 3, and P<KS3i> = 0.7?
11. List the computer programs currently accepted as stan-
dards by the JTCG/AS- Include the basic features of each.
12. Describe a campaign analysis. What items of information
are necessary for input and what rasulrs are output?
13. What are sf f ecti veness programs?
14. What is a survivability tradeoff study?
15. List the maintenance factors which might influence the
potential inclusion of a survivability enhancement feature.
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16. How can tha inclusion of redundancy in a system decrease
system reliability?
17, What is the single basis of comparison to which all





1. Aircraft combat survivability is the capability of an
aircraft to avoid and/or withstand a man-made hostile envi-
ronment.
2. A survivability assessment is done by combining:
A. the results of the mission-threat analysis,
B. the results of the vulnerability assessment, and
C. the results of the susceptibility assessment.
3. The three most commonly used msasures of survivability
ars:
A. ?<KSS>, the probability the aircraft is killed
given a single shot.
B. P<K/E>, The probability the aircraft is killed
given a one-on-one encounter with a single weapon.
C. P<K/M), the probability the aircraft is killed given
multiple encounters or the sortie survivability.
U. A scenario is a description of the many parameters that
characterize an encounter between an aircraft and a defensive weapon
system. The parameters include the iircraft flight path, the
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threat (type, number, locatior. , and operations), the ^nvironiisn-ai
conditions, and the terrain.
5- P<KSS> is computed using:
A. Ability of the fire control/guidance system to direct
the propagator against the aircraft
B. Fuzing employed (if any)
C. Aircraft vulnerability
6. The variables of the P<K/D> function are:
A. Aircraft vulnerable area
B. Location of the detonation
C. The spray angle of the ejected fragments cr propagators
D. The number of fragments ejected
E. The velocities of the varhead and aircraft
7. The elements of P<S/E> are:
A. P<D> - cumulative probability of detection
B. P<L> - probality of launch
C. P<KSS> - probability of kill given a single shot
D. N - the number of launches or firings
It should be noted that barage fire or a missile launched
during a search does not require detection to take place.
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8. ENCOUNTER A (AIHCBAFT VS SAM)
P<S/E> = (1.0 - (0.72) * (0.50)* (3-88) )**a
= (1.0 - 0.3168) **U
= (0.6832) **4
= 0.0101 = 1.0U
ENCOUNTER B (AIRCRAFT 7S AAA)
P<S/E> = (1.0 - (0-61) * (1.0) *(0. 003) ) **820
= (1.0 - 0.0018) **820
= (.99817) **320
= 0. 22269 = 22-27%
The aircraft is more liksly to survivs the encounter with
the AAA site.
9. The principal elements of th= computation of sortie
survivability are:
A. The total number of aircraft in the raid
B. The number of weapons encountered
C. The probability of survival for each encounter
(It must be noted that multiple types of threats may




10. Th9 following BASIC program was run to evaluate rh<=
sortie survivability function.
10 PSS = 1
20 FOR a-^ to 20
30 FOR n=1 to 50
aO PSS = PSS*(1 - .9*. 8*. 001)
50 NEXT N
60 NEXT M
7 PRINT "PSS="; PSS
The result was: PSS= .486615
The approximation is:
P<S/S> = 9xp((-1) (suin(iD) P<K/E>)
= sxp ((-1) *50*20*0.9*0.3*0.001)
= sxp (-0. 72)
= 0.486752
The approximation is quit? good for these conditions.
For the second set of input data
The exact result is: P<S/S> = 4.35E-25
The approximation is:
P<S/S> = exp (- (20*4*0.9*0.8*0.71 )
= axp (-40.32) = 3.09E-13
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Seven orders of magnitude difference.
However, it is so near zero that it makes little
difference.
For the last set of input data.
The exact solution is: P<S/S> = 2.22E-4
The approximation is:
P<S/S> = exp (- (3*4*0.9*0.8*0.7) I
= exp (-6. OU)
= 2. 36E-3
Still an order of magnitude error.
11. The currently accepted "standard" programs are:
A. BLUEMAX - Used to generate flight paths for fixed-
wing subsonic aircraft, sea level to 20,000 feet. Used to
simulate the ground attack scenario.
B. P001 - Used to evaluate an aircraft one-cn-one
engagement with a ground based gun system. Wide latitude is
available in the gun characteristics. The program is
capable of accepting maneuvering flight paths as input, but
can only generate a straight and level flight path itself.
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C. SAMS - Models the characteristics and capabilities of
ten Soviet SAM systems (DOD desig, SA-2 through SA-1 1) .
Models sensor and tracking parameters, flight path dynamics
and control, target vulnerability, and countermeasures.
One-on-one engagements only. Warhead fuzing and detonaxion
are also modeled.
D. PACAM 7 - Aerial combat is modeled in 3D. Asymerric
tactics and the possibility of escape are allowed.
Detection is a function of range and target size. Bomber
penetration and defensive tactics are modeled, and ground
launched SAMs may be used.
12, A campaign analysis is a mathematical modeling of
multiple encounters between friendly aircraft and hostile
air defense systems for a specified number of raids or
sorties. Strike aircraft encounter multiple AAA, SAM, and
AI in a zone defense pattern. Point defense weapons may be
used in the vacinity of the target. The results can include
the probability an aircraft survives zhe sortie, the prob-
ability an aircraft is damaged, and the number of bombs
dropped on the target. Multiple raids on the target may be
run by aircraft undamaged on previous raids.
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13. Ef i€Ctivaness programs (examplas: TACOS and EVADE) ar9
large scale compuxer programs which aodsl large deployments
of air defence sysrems attacked by many aircraft and
missiles. Typically the terrain of the battle area is an
input (or resident in the program) and terrain masking is
allowed. Electronic countermeasures may be used, and
command control of the air defence system may be used.
Effectiveness programs produce prodigous ammounrs of cross
referenced data, and use significant ammounts of computer
time
.
14. If a survivability enhancement feature does not add
cost, complexity, weight, performance, or some other type of
penelty, it probably should be included in the design. Most
enhancement features do involve panal-cies, however, and
their inclusion in the design must be guestioned. The
survivability tradeoff study is a methodical study of the
benefits and the penelties of each survivability enhancement
feature, and must include cost, maintainability, perform-
ance, weight, reliability, logistics, and any other factors
which can be quantified compared to the benefits to deter-




15. A. Mean task times (or accessability)
B. Downtime per flight hour
C. Maintenance man hours per flight hour
16. If each duplicate component in a redundant system has
the same reliability as the equivalsnt component in a single
system, it could be expected that a failure of the system
with duplicated components would cc:;ur twice as often. This
could rsduce system effectiveness and result in additional
maintenance time to support the system.
17. Cost is the single basis for comparison of survivability
enhancement features. It is a single measure by which all
survivability enhancement features can be compared, and is
in many cases the driving consideration for inclusion or




LEXICON OF SURVIVABILITY TERMS
For terms not listed below, please consul"
the index or JIIL-srD-2089.
accamulator, hydraulic: A pressurised hydraulic reser-
voir which stores energy that can be returned to the system
should the pump fail.
ACS - see aircraft combat survivability
actuator, hydraulic - see servoactuator
afterburner: Device attached to the tailpipe of a jet
engine which injects additional fuel into the exhaust, where
it burns to provide additional thrust,
aircraft combat survivability: The capability of an




AMSSA - U.S. Army Material Systsms Analysis Activiry
anhedral: Negative dihedral. When viewed from the back
or front, a downward slope of the wing from the root to the
tip,
anti-radiation missile: A missile which homes on radio
transmissions, such as those of a radar.
API - armor piercing incendiary
atmospheric absorption: The decrease in the intensity of
an electromagnetic signal due to interaction of the signal
with molecules in the air, principally carbon dioxide and
water in the case of infrared radiation.
autorotation: Qnpowered descending state of flight in a
helicopter, in which the rotor develops lift due to the flow
of air past the blades as the helicopter descends.
AVSCOM - U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command
ballistic: Unguided flight, as of a projectile or a
non-guided missile.
box beam: A rectangular load carrying member which has
relatively thin sides and a relatively large open center.
The sides parallel to the normal forces carry loads in
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shear, and the sides perpendicular to the normal fores carry
loads in tension and compression. Box beams are also used tc
carry torsional or twisting loads.
canard: A horizontal control surface on an airplane
located forward of the wing.
CAS - see control augmentation system
chaff: Radar reflecting material, usually ejected from
an aircraft to degrade search or fire control radars.
chromaticity : The tint or hue of an object; its color.
CNM - Chief of Naval Material
collective stick: k helicopter control lever which
controls the net airmount of lift produced by the rotor
system.
combat radius: The distance to which an aircraft can
fly, perform its mission, and return to base with an
adeguate fuel reserve.
conditional probability: The probability that an event




contrail: A white trail of condensed water vapor that
sometimes foras in the wake of an aircraft,
control augmentation system (CAS) : An active control
system in which both aircraft states and pilot control
inputs are used as feedback signals to augment both his
control and the stability of the aircraft.
control surface: A moveable panel hinged to a portion of
the wing, fuselage, or empenage which when moved changes the
airflow over the local surface.
countermeasure: The employment of devices and/or techni-
ques with the objective of impairing the operational effec-
tiveness of enemy activity.
CPA - closest point of approach
cruise speed: The normal operating speed of an aircraft
in transit from one geographic position to another.
cyclic stick: A helicopter control lever which controls
the direction of the lift vector of the rotor system.
damage mechanism: A warhead fragment, or any physical
entity that can cause damage to an aircraft, such as an
incindiary particle, a shock wave or a laser beam.
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DASCOM - U.S. Army Material Dsvslopment and Readiness
Command
dash spsei: A speed, higher than cruise speed, that is
used on the final penetration to ths target.
DCGMD - Deputy CDmmanding General for Material
Development
deceiver: An electronic device used to spoof or fool a
tracker by iniuceing errors in range and/or bearing, or by
creating additional (spurious) targsts.
deflagration wave: A relatively slow, low pressure
combustion process which may or may not result in a
sustained fire.
delayed failure: A design technique which atxempts to
lengthen the time between the occurance of damage of a
component and the components failura.
detonation wave: A rapid combastion characterized by a
sudden rise in pressure.
dihedral: An upward slope of ths centerline of the wings
when viewed from the fronr or rear.
DOC - Department of Defense
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drone - see remotely piloted vshicle
drop tank: k fuel tank carriai outside of an aircraft,
suspended from the wing or fuselage.
DSARC - Defense System Acquisition Review Council
ECM - electronic count ermeasures
ECP - Engineering Change Proposal
EEA - see Essential Elements of Analysis
expendable: A relatively inexpensive device such as
chaff, IR flares, etc. ejected by aircraft to decrease
susceptibility.
FAC - Forward Air Controller
fail-safe response: A failure mode in which the failure
of a component does net lead to additional system failure or
damage.
f ire-and-f orget: Ordnance which requires no additional
targeting information after launch.
flak: Slang term for anti-aircraft gunfire, particularly
that which has a high explosive warhead.
FLIR - see forward looking infrared detector
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forward looking infrared detector: An Infrared imageing
device which converts infrared dara ro video for cockpit
display.
fly-by-wire: A Flight control system which uses elec-
tronic signals to provide the input signal to the actuator
to position the flight controls, eliminating some or all of
the mechanical pushrods and cables.
fod - see foreign object damage
Also, particles which can cause foreign objecx damage.
Foreign Object Damage: Damage to the rotating components
of engines or rotor systems due to the ingestion of rela-
tively small particles such as rivets, gravel, etc. Often
causes catastrophic failure in turbine engines.
FSD - Full Scale Development
Gaussian distribution: A specific probability distribu-
tion that is symmetric about the mean and decreases above
and below the mean-
glint: The rapid change in radar cross section for small
changes in aircraft attitude.
GOR - General Operational Requirement
HE - high explosive
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hydraulic ram: A large fluid pressure due to the pene-
tration of a fluid ccntaining vessel such as a fuel tank, by
a high velocity penetrator.
hydrodynamic ram: see hydraulic ram
interceptor: An aircraft designed to rapidly take off
and fly out to engage approaching enemy aircraft.
IE - infrared radiation
IE flare: A high intensity pyrotechnic device ejected
from an aircraft in an attempt to decoy IE missiles and/or
tracking devices.
jammer: A transmitting device which attempts to degrade
or render useless tracking and/or fire control equipment.
JTCG/AS-Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft
Survivability
JTCG/ME-Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Munitions
Effectiveness
laser: Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of




launch-and-l-save : The use of gaidsd ordnance which does
not require the launching aircraft, to remain in the vicinity
of the target following launch.
loiter tine; The ammount of time an aircraft can delay
while airborne (such as for weather) and still complete its
assigned mission.
luminance: The luminous intensity of an object. Its
brightness.
MAK - Mission Attainment Measure
MEHS - Mission Essential Weapon Systems
MOMS - Measure of Mission Success
NASP - Naval Air Survivability Program
NCG - Air Force Nuclear Criteria Group
NMC - Naval Material Command
OR - Operational Requirement
OSD - Office of the Secretary of Defense
PDF - Probability density function
PE - Probable error
PMD - Program Management Directive
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propagator: Any projectile, missile, or radiation beam
directed against an aircraft.
RCS: radar cross section
rehear - see afterburner
relaxed static stability: A dssign philosophy or tech-
nique which relies on a flight control computer -co provide
good flying qualities, rather than building the flying qual-
ities into the aircraft. The aircraft may be unflyable if
the flight control computer fails.
remotely piloted vehicle: An unmanned flight vehicle,
controlled by radio signals or onboard systems. Sometimes
used as decoys or for surveilance in areas considered too
dangerous to fly manned aircraft.
retrofit: A change in the design of an existing aircraft
to incorporate improvements.
RFP - request for proposal
RMS - root-mean-square
ROC - required operational capability
RPV - see remotely piloted vehicle
SAS - see stability augmentation sysrem
125

servoactuator: A power device ^hich uses mechanincal or
electrical inputs to control its outpur. Used to position
flight control surfaces.
speed brake: A control surface used primarily to
increase aircraft drag. It is ussd to slow the aircraft
rapidly and to increase the rate of descent without
increasing aircraft speed,
spoiler: A control surface mounted on wings and used to
decrease lift.
stability augmentation system (SAS) :
An active control system in which certain aircraft
states are sensed and used as feedback signals to augment
the natural stability of an aircraft.
supercharger: A Mechanical device which compresses inlet
combustion air to increase the power output of a recipor-
cating engine.
swashplate: The mechanical coupling device between the
stationary servoactuators and the rotating rotor head of a
helicopter which transmits control lotion to the rotor head.
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torque box: A hollow square or rectangular closed struc-
ture used to resist twisting.
THAC - Threat Review Advisory Committee
TWS - track while scan
ullage: The open space above the fuel in a fuel tank.
UV - ultraviolet radiation





accumulatDr, hydraulic -II.B.4,e. also, see Lexicon
ACS - see aircraft combat survivability
AFCS - sea automatic flight control system
AFLC - see Air Force Logistics Command
AFR 80-14
AFR 80-38 -I.e. 3.
AFSC - see Air Force Systmes Command
afterburner -II.B.3.a . (2) . also, see Lexicon
aileron -II.B.4.b.
AIR - 5164 -I. C.2.
Air Force Logistics Command -I.C. 3.
Air Force Nuclear Criteria Group -I.C. 3.
Air Force Systems Command -1.3.3.
Air Force Test 5 Evaluation Center -I.C. 3.
aircraft combat survivability -I. A.I.
AMSSA - see 0. S. Army Material Systems Analysis
Activity
angle (tracking error) -VI. C. 3. a. (3)
anhadral -II,B.4.a. also, see Lexicon
anti-radiation missile -Vl.D.4.d., VII. B.I.
APO - see auxiliary power unit
AR-107 -I.D
armament system -II. B. 6., V.B.3.e. (8)
atmospheric absorption -VI. C.2. b. (3)
also, see Lexicon
atmospheric attenuation -II. E. 2. a. (5)
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automatic flight control system -II.B.4.d., II. C.
5
autorotation -II. C. 7. also, sse Lexicon
auxiliary power unit -II, C. 5.
availability -I-A.4
avionics system -II. B. 6., V.B.3.e.(8)
Battle Damage Assessment and Reporting Program
-IV. B.
Battle Damage Assessment and Reporting Teams
-IV. B.
3DARP - sse Battle Damage Assessment and Reporting
Program
BDART - see Battle Damage Assessment and Reporting
Teams
blast -II.C.2.C. (1) , II.C.2.d., V.C.6.a.
box team -II.B.2.a. also, see Lexicon
bulkhead -II.B.2.a.
canard -II.B.2.C. also, see Lexicon
CAS - See control augmentation system
«
CDIC - see Combat Data Information Center
Center for Naval Analysis -IV. D.I.
chaff -Vl.D.a.a. also, see Lexicon
Chief of Naval Material -I.e. 2.
chromaticity -see Lexicon
closest point of approach -VI. C.I.
CNA - see Center for Naval Analysis
CNM - see Chief of Naval Material
collective stick -see Lexicon
Combat Data Information Center -IV. A., IV. B.
combat radius -see Lexicon
conditional probability -see Lexicon
contrail -see Lexicon
control augmentation system -II.B.U.d.
also, see Lexicon
control surface -II.B.U.d. also, see Lexicon
coordinated tracking errors -IV. c. 3. a. (2)
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coordinated threat suppression tactics -III. A. 5.
countermeasura -see Lexicon
CPA - see closest point of approach
crew -11.3,6., V.B.3.e.(5)
cruise speed -see Lexicon
cyclic stick -see Lexicon
damage mechanism -III.C.3. also, see Lexicon
DARCCM - see Q.S. Army Material Development and
Readiness Command
DARCCM Regulation 70-3 -I.C.1
dash speed -see Lexicon
DCGMD - Deputy Commanding General For Material
Development
DCP - see Decision Coordinating Paper
dead zone -III.D.3.d.
deceiver -see Lexicon
deceiver, IR -71. D. 2.
deceiver, radar -VI.D.2.b.
Decision Coordinating Paper -I.e.
3
Design Handbook -I.E.
deflagration -III.C.3.C. also, see Lexicon
delayed failure -see Lexicon
Deputy Commanding General For Material Development
I.C.I.
detonatioQ -III.C. 3. c
.
(2) also, see Lexicon
DH - see Design Handbook
dihedral -II.B.U.a. also, see Lexicon
DOE - Department Of Defense
Dragon's Jaw Bridge -III. A. 14.
drive train -II. C. 4.
drone -71. D. 4.
drop tank -II.B.S.a. also, see Lexicon
ECM - see electronic countermeasures
ECS - see environmental control system
EEA - see Essential Elements Analysis
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eleven -II . B. 4. b.
environmental control system -II. B. 6.
error (fire control) -II. E. I.e.
Essential Elements Analysis -VI.B.
expendable -VI.D.U. also, see Lexicon
FA - see Frontal Aviation
FAC - see forward air controller
fail-safe response -see Lexicon
feed tank -II.B.U.b.




flight control system -II.B.U., II. C. 5., 7.B.3.e.(3)
FLIR - see forward looking infrared detector
fly-by-wire -II.B.4.C. also, see Lexicon
FOD - see foreign object damage
foreign object damage -II. C. 3. also, see Lexicon
forward air controller -I. A. 4.
forward iDoking infrared detector -see Lexicon
Frontal Aviation -III-F.3.
fuel -II.B.S.d.
fuel system -II. B. 5., V.B.3-e. (1)
fuze -III-C.2.a., VII .B. 2. a. (2)
Gaussian distribution -see Lexicon
glint -see Lexicon
HE - see high explosive
high explosive -V.C.6.
hydraulic system -II.B.4.e.
hydraulic ram -III. C. 3. a
.
(2) also, see Lexicon
incendiary -II .C.2.b(3) , III. 3. 3. c.
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infrared radiation -VI,C.2.b., VI.D.3.b.







IE - see infrared radiation
IE flare -Vl.D.U.d. also, see Lexicon
Iron Hand -III. A. 5.
irreversible control system -II.B.U.b.
jammer - VI .D . 1 .a. (1) , VI. D. 2., VI.D.2.C., Vl.D.2.d.
also, see Lexicon
Jet A -II.B. 5.d.
Jet A-1 -II.B.S.d.
Jet B -II.B.S.d.
JMSNS - see Justification 'for ^^ajor System New Start
jitter -III. E. 1.C. (4)
Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft
Survivability -I.C.4
Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Munitions








JTCG/ME - see Joint Technical Coordinating Group on
Munitioins Effectiveness






laser -III.C.3.e., V.C.7. alsD, see Lexicon
launch and recovery system -II. B. 6., II. C. 7.
launch-and-leave -II. E.2.b. (3) (a) also, see Lexicon
liquid oxygen -II, B. 6.
loiter time -see Lexicon
longeron -II. B.2.b.
Loss-Cause Evaluation Form -IV. D.I.
Loss-Cause Failure Sequences -IV. D.I.
Loss-Cause Networks
LOX - see liquid oxygen
luminance -VI.C.2.C. also, see Lexicon
MAM - see mission attainment measure
maximum effective range -III.D.3.d.
measure of mission success -I.A.U.




MIL-STD-2072 (AS) -I. D.
MIL-STD-2089 -I.A-6.
MIL-STD-4U9A -I.F.
Mission Essential Weapon Systems -I.C.2.
Mission Threat Analysis -I. A. 5.
Mission Attainment Measure -I. A. 4., VII. C.
mixer assembly -II. C. 5.
MOMS - see Measure of Mission Success
motive flow -II.B.S.b.
multipath effects -III.D.3.d.
NASP - see Naval Air Survivability Program
NAVAIR Instruction 3920.1 -I.C.2.
Naval Air Survivability Program -I.e. 2.
NAVMAT Instruction 3900.16 -I.C.2.
NCG - see Air Force Nuclear Criteria Group
noise jammer -VI.D-2. a.
Operational Test and Evaluation -I.e. 3.
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oxygen subsystem II. B. 6.
penetrator -III.C.2.b., III. C. 3. a.
PMD - see program management directive
power boosted system (control) -II.3.4,e.
power operated system (control) -II.B.U.e.
power train -II. B. 3., II. C, II. C. 4.
probability of hit -I.A-1.
probability of kill -I.A.I.
probability of kill, given a hit -I.A.I.
probability of survival -I.A.I.
Program Management Directive -I.e. 3.
Project Manager -I-C.1.
projectile -III.C. 1. b . (1)
propagator -see Lexicon
propulsion system -II. C. 3., 7.B.3.e. (2)
proximity fuse -711. B -3. a. (3) (b)
radar absorbant material -VI. D. 3. a. (1)
radar cross section -VI.C.2.a.
radar homing and warning system -71. D.I.
radar horizon -VI. C.3 .a. (1) (a)
radar signature -VI.C.2.a., 7I.D.3.a.
RAG - see Requirement Assessment Sroup
raster (tracker) -71. c.3. b. (2) (a)
RCS - see radar cross section
redundant -7. B.3. f
.
(1 ) , 7.C.4. b.
reheat - see afterburner
relaxed static stability -II.B.U.a. also, see Lexicon
remotely piloted vehicle -71. D. 4. also, see Lexicon
Request for Proposal -I.e. 3.
Requirements Assessment Group -I.e. 3.
reticle tracker -7I.C.2.b.
retrofit -see Lexicon
RFP - see Request for Proposal
rib -II.B.2.a
rosette tracker -7l.C.3.b. (2) (a)
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rotating linear array (tracker) -VI. C. 3 .b. ( 2) ( b)
rotor blade -II.C.U.
RP7 - s€e remotely piloted vehi::l5
rudder -II.B.4.b
SAS - see stability augmentation system
Schweinfurt -IV. A.I. a.
semimonocoque construction -II.B.2.a., II. C. 2.
servcactuator -II. B. 4., II.B-4.e.
shotline generator -V.C.8.
signature -I- A. 5-, VI. C. 2., VI. D. 3.
signature reduction -VI.D.3.
slat -II.B.u.b.
SON - see Statement of Operational Need
spallationi -II.C.3.b.2.
spar -II.B.2.a.
speed brake -II.B.u.b. also, see Lexicon
spinning reticle (tracker) -VI.C.3.b.,
VI. C. 3. (b) (2) (a)
spoiler -II.B.u.b. also, see Lexicon
stabilator -II.C-5.
stability -II.B.U.a.




Statement of Operational Need -I.e. 3.
stringer -II.B.2.b.
sump tank -II.B.u.b.
supercharger -II.B.3. a. ( 1) . also, see Lexicon
survivability -I.A.I,
survivability assessment -I. A. 5.
survival rate -VII. C.
susceptibility -I.A.1., VI. A.
susceptability assessment -VI. A., VI. C, VII. B. 2.
swashplats -II.C.U. also, see Lexicon
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threat platform -III. C.I. a.
threat propagator -Ill.Cl.b.
threat suppression -III. A. 5.
torque box -II.B.2.a. also, see Lexicon
torque tube -II.B.2.a.
total tracking error model -III.C.3. a. (4) .
trade-off study -I. A. 5., VII. D.
transmission, main -II.C.U.
trim tab -II.B.U.b.
troops of air defense of the Ground Forces -III. F.I.
III.F. 1. b.
turbofan engine -II. B . 3. a, (2)
turbojet engine -II. B .3. a. (2)
turboprop engine -II. B. 3. a. (2)
turboshaft engine -II .B. 3, a. (2)
U.S. Army Aviation Research and Development Command
-I.C.I .
D.S. Army Material Development and Readinsss Command
-I.C.I.
U.S. Army Material Systems Analysis Activity -I.C.1
ullage -see Lexicon
OSAAMRDL rR-71-U1 -I. E
visual signature -VII. C. 2. c, VI.D.3.C.
visually directed systems -VII. C. 3. c.
vulnerability -VI. A. 3.
vulnerability assessment -I. A. 5., V.c.
vulnerable area -V.c. 4.
vulnerable area routine -V.c.8.b.
wet tank -II.B.S.a.
wet wing - see wet tank




VARIABLES FOR EQUATIONS OF PROBABILITY
A<p> Presented area of the aircraft
A<pi> Presented area of the ith component
A<po> Component overlap area
A<v> Vulnerable area of zhe aircraft
A<vi> Vulnerable area of the ith component
A<vo> Vulnerable area of the overlap area
K<nrc>< j> Probability one or more nonredundant
components are killed after j hits
K<rc><j> Probability that all redundant
components in a system are killed
after j hits
P<CD> Cumulative probability of detection
P<hi> Probability of hit of the ith component
P<K> Probability of aircraft kill
P<K><j) Probability the aircraft is killed
after j hits
P<KSS> Probability of aircraft kill given
a single shot

















Probability of aircraft kill given a
one-on-one encoanter
probability of aircraf- kill, given a hit
on the aircraft
Probability of kill of the ith componenx
Probability of kill given a hit of
the ith component
Probability of kill of the overlap area
Probability of kill of the ith component
due to the jth random hit
on the aircraft
Probability of kill of the aircraft due
to the jth hit on the aircraft
Probability that a propagator will be
launched /fired at the aircraft
Probability of aircraft survival
Probability the iircraft survives
a single shot encounter
Probability an aircraft survives
a sortie
Probability the ith component will
survive the jth random hit on
on the aircraft
Probability of survival of the
ith component
Probability the ith component survives
after n random hits on the aircraft
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P<S>^n> Probability of survival of the aircraft
after n random hits on the aircraft
P<So> Probability of aircraft survival,
given a hit in the overlap area
(T) Kill transition natrix
(S)<j5 Vector of probabilities that the
aircraft exists in each of the
possible states after the jth hit
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GENERAL EQUATIONS OF PROBABILITY
Valnerable area of the ith component
A<vi> = A<pi>*P<lc/hi>
Probability of survival
P<S> = 1 - P<K>
Probability of Jcill of the ith component
P<k/Hi> = P<hi>*P<k/hi>
Probability of kill, given a hit of the ith component
P<k/hi> = A<vi>/A<pi>
Probability of hit of the ith component
P<hi> = A<pi>/A<p>
Probability of kill of the ith component,




SINGLE HIT VULNERABILITY, NO REDUNDANCY, NO OVERLAP
Probability of aircraft icill, givea a hir on the aircraft
P<K/H> = ^ P<ic/Hi>
P<K/H> = 1/A<P>*^A<vi>
P<K/H> = A<V>/A<P>
Vulnerable area of the aircraft
&<v> = Y. A<7i>
The above are valid for single hit calculations on a redun-
dant aircraft with no overlap, with the observation that
redundant components do not contribute to vulnerable area.
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SINGLE HIT VULNERABILITY, NO REDaNDANCY, WITH OVERLAP
Probability of aircraft survival, given a hit of
the overlap region








SINGLE HIT VaLNERABILITY, WITH REDUNDANCY, WITH OVERLAP
Probability of aircraft survival, given a hit on
the overlap area
P<So> = P<S1>*P<S2>*P(1-P<k/h3>*P<k/ha>) *...
Where P(k/h3) and P(k/ha) are the probabili-ciss of kill
given a hit on the third and fourth components.
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MULTIPLE HIT VOLNE RABILITY, NO REDUNDANCY
Probability the ith component survives n random





Probability the ith component survives the jth
random hit on the aircraft
P<si><j> - 1 - P<lc/Hi>(j>





MULTIPLE HIT VULNERABILITY, WITH REDUNDANCY
Probability that the aircraft is in each of the possible
states after the (j *- 1) th hit
(S) <j^i ) =<T) (S) <j)
Probability the aircraft is killed after -he jth hit




Probability the aircraft is killed in an
single shot encounter
P<K/E> = P<C/D>*P<L>*P<KSS>
Probability the aircraft survives the
single shot encounter
P<S/E> = 1 - P<K/S>
Probability the aircraft survives N gun shots
or missile launches
P<S/E> = (1-P<CD>*P<L>*P<KSS>) **N
If the probability of survival fDr each shot is nearly
unity, the following approximation may be used:
P<S/E> = exp(-N*P<CD>*P<L>*P<KSS>
The probability the aircraft survives M encounters of
N shots or launches each is
P<S/S> = (1-P<CD>*P<L>*P<KSS) ** (M*N)
If the probabilities of survival of the individual
encounters is nearly unity, the following
approximation may be used:
P<S/S> = exp (-M*P<K/E>)
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VARIABLES FOR EQUATIONS OF INFRARED RADIATION
A Sensor araa
cm centimster
L<a> Atmospheric loss or attenuation of
IR signature
P<I> Aircraft IR signature in the direction
of seeker ( Watts/staaradian)
R<lo> Lock on range of IR seeker
S<min> Minimum power in the operating band









5.6697*1 012 w/cm2 K*
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GENERAL EQUATIONS OF INFRARED RADIATION
Gray body radiant saittance
H =6*(J*T* (WatT:s/cin2 )
P^ak spectral emittanca
= (3000) /T( K) ( /i a)




VARIABLES FOR EQUATIONS 0? RADAR
A Area of radar antenna
A<€> Effective area of radar antenna
B Bandwidth of radar receiver
C Hinimum J/S ratiD that will conceal the
echo in the noiss
c Velocity of propoga-cion of
electromagnetic radiarion
F Electric field strength at the
receiving antenna
f Frequency of electromagnetic waves
f<r> Pulse repetition rate or frequency
f<d> Doppler frequency
G<j> Gain of jammer antenna in the
direction of radar
G<r> Gain of radar transmitting antenna
g Vaires from 51 for a uniform
illumination function to
80 for a cosine squared function
h<ac> Height of aircraft in meters
h<ant> Height of radar antenna in meters
J/S Jammer to radar signal power ratio
1t*9

L Signal losses due to atmospheric
attenuation and signal processing
in the radar system
L<a> Signal and echo loss due to
atmospheric attenuation
L<s> Sadar system losses
N Total noise in radar system
P<j> Jammer power per unit bandwidth
P<r> Peak power of raiar transmitter
R Distance from radar to aircraft
R<B> Jammer burn through range
R<H> Radar horizon in kilometers
R<max> Maximum detection range of target
T Noise factor per unit bandwidth
(U+IO-sa Watts/Hz at room temperature)
V<r> Radial velocity of the target
^<min> Signal to noise ratio associated with
a specific probability of
detection and false alarm
X Wavelength of electromagnetic
radiation
P Antenna efficiency factor
(0.6 is a nominal value)


















R = (c* )/2
Echo power received
S = P<r>*G<r>*A<e>*0"/('**7r) 2*R*




Echo power to noisa ratio
S/N = p<r>*G<r>*X2*a*/('4*'7r) ^*R**I'*N
s/N = p<r>*G<r>*X2*0?(a*7r) 3*R**L*T*B
Jam-to- signal ratio
J/S = (P<j>*B*G<j>/P<r>*G<c>)* (4*7r/cr) *R2
Jammer barn through range
R<B>=(P<r>*G<r>*(7*C/P<j>*B*G<j>*(a*7f) **0.5
Average power/duty cycle relationship
P (average) = P<r>*(daty cycle)
Doppler freguency
f<d> = 2*f*V<r>/c = 2*^<->/\
Antenna gain
G = 4*7r*P*A/ \z
G = n*7T*k<e>/\2
Antenna beamwidth




1, Ball, R. E. . Ths Fundamentals Of Aircraft Combat







ger, R. F,. Measuring Instructional Intent, Lear-Siegler,





1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria Va 2231U
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey Ca 93943




4. LCDR P.G, Cox 2
SMC 19 14
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, Ca 93 943




6. LCDR D.T. Hogan 1
Deoartment or Electrical Engineering










I. O ... J I
Cox
Educational aids In
aircraft combat siirvl-
vabrllty.
^T^rTi"!^

